

CIA/DCI/BRIEF 199-75

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010101-7

30 DECEMBER 1975

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 199-75.4

1. INDIA: A NATIONAL CONVENTION OF PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI'S CONGRESS PARTY ON MONDAY UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED A RESOLUTION SHE ENDORSED CALLING FOR AN INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE SIX-MONTH-OLD STATE OF EMERGENCY AND A YEAR'S POSTPONEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS THAT WERE DUE NEXT MARCH.4

THE NEED FOR THE MOVE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO UNSPECIFIED INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL "FORCES OF DESTABILIZATION" THAT WERE SAID TO BE CONTINUING TO THREATEN THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. AS LONG AS THE EMERGENCY REMAINS IN EFFECT, THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT, ELECTED IN 1971, CAN EXTEND ITS OWN LIFE FOR SUCCESSIVE ONE-YEAR PERIODS BY A MAJORITY VOTE.4

THE PARTY'S TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT ENSURES QUICK APPROVAL OF THE EXTENSION WHEN THE NEXT LEGISLATIVE SESSION BEGINS ON 4 JANUARY 5. WITH AN EXCELLENT FALL HARVEST AND INFLATION AT LEAST 3 TEMPORARILY UNDER CONTROL, THE MOVE TO DELAY ELECTIONS IS NOT EXPECTED 2 TO MEET WITH SERIOUS OPPOSITION FROM THE PUBLIC.4

THE PARTY RESOLUTION ALSO CALLED FOR A "THROUGH RE-EXAMINATION"

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OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS A "LIVING DOCUMENT" THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO "THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE." THIS PROPOSAL SUGGESTS THAT GANDHI MAY NEXT PUSH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS AIMED AT PERMANENTLY STRENGTHENING THE POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.4

IN ANY REWRITING OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE JUDICIARY IS LIKELY TO BE WEAKENED. IT HAS CHALLENGED THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOME OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EMERGENCY MEASURES AND REMAINS THE PRINCIPLE OBSTACLE TO GANDHI'S AUTHORITARIAN RULE. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2, IMPDET.4

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 199-75.4

1. USSR-CHINA: MOSCOW HAS REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO CHINA'S
 DECISION ON SATURDAY TO RELEASE THE THREE SOVIET HELICOPTER CREWMEN.
 SOVIET MEDIA HAVE CARRIED ONLY BRIEF FACTUAL REPORTS ON THE RELEASE
 AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE CREW IN MOSCOW. THE REPORTS DO NOT CONVEY THE
 IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE DONE ANYTHING DRAMATIC, BUT THE
 OVERALL NUMBER OF NEGATIVE ITEMS ON CHINA HAS DROPPED OFF.4

SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN PEKING, HOWEVER, ARE OBVIOUSLY
 PLEASED ABOUT THE RELEASE, PROFESSING TO SEE IN IT A MAJOR
 CONCILIATORY GESTURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED
 BY THE CHINESE ACTION AND WERE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY WHAT THEY SAW
 AS AN APOLOGETIC TONE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT.4

ASSUMING THE SOVIETS WERE INDEED TAKEN BY SURPRISE, THEY WILL
 PROBABLY NOW PROBE FOR CHINESE FLEXIBILITY ON THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE
 4 ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS COULD INVOLVE A COMPARABLE
 3 GESTURE BY MOSCOW.4

2 SOVIET OFFICIALS IN PEKING ARE ALREADY DISCOUNTING THE IMPORTANCE
 1 OF MOSCOW'S REVELATION TWO WEEKS AGO THAT CHINA HOLDS THREE ADDITIONAL

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SOVIETS WHO ALLEGEDLY "INADVERTENTLY" STRAYED ACROSS THE BORDER.

THEY MAINTAIN—UNLIKE SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW—THAT THE THREE MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN DEFECTORS.4

THE SOVIETS' CHIEF NEGOTIATOR AT THE BORDER TALKS, WHO WAS BROUGHT HOME LAST MAY, COULD BE SENT BACK TO PEKING. MOSCOW COULD MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT THE ANNUAL RIVER NAVIGATION TALKS TO GET UNDER WAY. NO TALKS WERE HELD IN 1975—FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS—BECAUSE PEKING DEMANDED PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INCLUSION OF TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA.4

(CONFIDENTIAL)

2. THAILAND-LAOS: THAI PRIME MINISTER KHUKRIT ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING THAT THE BORDER WITH LAOS WILL BE REOPENED AT TWO PLACES ON JANUARY 1. KHUKRIT TOLD REPORTERS THIS IS A NEW YEAR'S GIFT TO THE LAO PEOPLE, AND NAMED THE TWO CROSSING POINTS. THA SADET AND THA PHAE KHANAN YON. THE BORDER HAS BEEN CLOSED SINCE NOVEMBER 18, FOLLOWING A LAO ATTACK ON A THAI PATROL BOAT ON THE MEKONG RIVER. THE CLOSURE HAS LED TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND FOOD SHORTAGES IN VIENTIANE.

2 {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2, IMPDET.4

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 199-75.4

1. USSR-CHINA: MOSCOW HAS REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO CHINA'S DECISION ON SATURDAY TO RELEASE THE THREE SOVIET HELICOPTER CREWMEN. SOVIET MEDIA HAVE CARRIED ONLY BRIEF FACTUAL REPORTS OF THE RELEASE AND THE ARRIVAL OF THE CREW IN MOSCOW. THE REPORTS DO NOT CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE DONE ANYTHING DRAMATIC, BUT THE OVERALL NUMBER OF NEGATIVE ITEMS ON CHINA HAS DROPPED OFF.4

SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN PEKING, HOWEVER, ARE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED ABOUT THE RELEASE, PROFESSING TO SEE IN IT A MAJOR CONCILIATORY GESTURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THEY WERE SURPRISED BY THE CHINESE ACTION AND WERE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY WHAT THEY SAW AS AN APOLOGETIC TONE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT.4

ASSUMING THE SOVIETS WERE INDEED TAKEN BY SURPRISE, THEY WILL PROBABLY NOW PROBE FOR CHINESE FLEXIBILITY ON THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS COULD INVOLVE A COMPARABLE GESTURE BY MOSCOW.4

SOVIET OFFICIALS IN PEKING ARE ALREADY DISCOUNTING THE IMPORTANCE OF MOSCOW'S REVELATION TWO WEEKS AGO THAT CHINA HOLDS

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THREE ADDITIONAL SOVIETS WHO ALLEGEDLY "INADVERTENTLY" (STRAYED ACROSS THE BORDER. THEY MAINTAIN—UNLIKE SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW—THAT THE THREE MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN DEFECTORS.4

THE SOVIET'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR AT THE BORDER TALKS, WHO WAS BROUGHT HOME LAST MAY, COULD BE SENT BACK TO PEKING. MOSCOW COULD MAKE SOME CONCESSION THAT WOULD PERMIT THE ANNUAL RIVER NAVIGATION TALKS TO GET UNDER WAY. NO TALKS WERE HELD IN 1975—FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS—BECAUSE PEKING DEMANDED PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INCLUSION OF TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA.4

EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS IN PEKING ARE SPECULATING THAT CHINA TIMED THE RELEASE OF THE AIRMEN TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS THAT IS SET TO OPEN IN FEBRUARY. THEY CONJECTURE THAT PEKING HOPES TO FORESTALL ANY MOVE TOWARD A HARDER LINE POLICY TOWARD CHINA.4

THIS REASONING GREATLY EXAGGERATES THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR A MORE BELLICOSE CHINA POLICY WITHIN KREMLIN COUNCILS, BUT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO AVOID

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APPEARING THE INTRANSIGENT PARTNER TO THE DISPUTE. PRIOR TO THE
 LAST CONGRESS, IN 1971, MOSCOW MADE A NEW OFFER ON THE BORDER
 ISSUE, A NON-USE-OF-FORCE PROPOSAL, AND AN APPEAL FOR
 CONSULTATIONS ON INDOCHINA. {CONFIDENTIAL} 4

2. USSR-TURKEY: SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN'S GOOD-WILL VISIT TO TURKEY
 TURKEY WAS SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, BUT BOTH SIDES USED IT TO SUGGEST AN
 IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND ANKARA.4

IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF THE VISIT, THE USSR
 AND TURKEY SAID THEY INTEND TO PREPARE A "POLITICAL DOCUMENT"
 ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION. THIS APPEARS TO BE AN
 ATTEMPT BY THE TURKS TO SIDESTEP MOSCOW'S OFT-MADE PROPOSAL
 FOR A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. IT MAY INVOLVE NO
 MORE THAN A REITERATION OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THE
 TWO SIDES SIGNED DURING SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNYY'S VISIT IN 1972.4

4 THE NEW DOCUMENT IS TO BE SIGNED AT A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN
 3 THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS SUGGESTS THAT TURKISH PRIME MINISTER
 2 DEMIREL WILL PICK UP KOSYGIN'S INVITATION TO VISIT MOSCOW NEXT YEAR.4

MOSCOW AND ANKARA APPEAR TO HAVE PREVENTED THE CYPRUS ISSUE

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FROM BECOMING A BONE OF CONTENTION. THEY REITERATED THEIR POSITIONS,
 AND THE OPAQUE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE SUCCEEDED IN CONCEALING
 THEIR DIFFERENCES.4

IN ADDITION TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS,
 KOSYGIN MET WITH OPPOSITION LEADER BULENT ECEVIT, AND SEEMED TO
 DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO HIM AT A DINNER GIVEN BY DEMIREL.
 THE SOVIETS, WHO COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON ECEVIT'S POLICIES

WHILE HE WAS IN OFFICE, UNDOUBTEDLY CALCULATE THAT THE FORMER
 PRIME MINISTER HAS A GOOD CHANCE TO RETURN TO POWER. [CONFIDENTIAL]4

3-ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: TWO VISITS LAST WEEK BY HIGH-RANKING
 ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS SHOULD HELP TO SQUELCH RUMORS
 THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN BUCHAREST AND BELGRADE FORCED
 THE CANCELLATION OF PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU'S TRIP TO
 YUGOSLAVIA IN OCTOBER.4

4 THE VISITS, BY YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC
 3 TO BUCHAREST AND BY ROMANIAN FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER
 2 PATAN TO BELGRADE, CAME ON THE HEELS OF CEAUSESCU'S
 2 FORCEFUL REASSERTION ON DECEMBER 18 OF ROMANIA'S

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INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. CEAUSESCU HAD UNDER-
SCORED THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN BELGRADE AND BUCHA-
REST ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THEIR MU-
TUAL DETERMINATION TO RESIST SOVIET CLAIMS TO LEAD-
ERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.4

BOTH COMMUNIQUEES SUMMARIZING THE TALKS STRESSED THE "COMPLETE TRUST" AND "WARM FRIENDSHIP" EXISTING BETWEEN THE TWO BALKAN NEIGHBORS. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TALKS BETWEEN MINIC AND HIS ROMANIAN COUNTERPART, GEORGE MACOVESCU, HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED, BUT MINIC PROBABLY BRIEFED THE ROMANIANS ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MOSCOW, WHERE HE DISCUSSED SOVIET MEDDLING IN YUGOSLAV INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND OTHER IMPORTANT BILATERAL ISSUES. PATAN'S TALKS IN BELGRADE PRO-

4 DUCED A TRADE AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD 1976-80 AND
3 A COMMODITY TRADE PROTOCOL FOR THE COMING YEAR.

2 {CONFIDENTIAL}4

4. YUGOSLAVIA: FOLLOWING SEVERAL MONTHS OF RUMORS, BELGRADE

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LAST FRIDAY FOR THE FIRST TIME ANNOUNCED THAT VLAD-
IMIR DAPCEVIC, A PRO-SOVIET, ANTI-TITO EMIGRE, IS
UNDER ARREST IN YUGOSLAVIA. THE ANNOUNCEMENT MAY
PRESAGE WIDER PUBLICITY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
COMINFORMISTS AND, HENCE, HIGHER TENSIONS IN SOVIET-
YUGOSLAV RELATIONS.4

DAPCEVIC DISAPPEARED LAST AUGUST WHILE IN BU-
CHAREST. IN AN OBVIOUS EFFORT
TO GLOSS OVER THE ROMANIAN CONNECTION, FRIDAY'S
PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT SAID THAT DAPCEVIC WAS "ARRESTED
ON THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY WHILE CARRYING OUT
HOSTILE ACTIVITY." BELGRADE DID NOT REVEAL WHEN
DAPCEVIC WAS APPREHENDED.4

FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC'S VISIT TO BUCHAREST

4 AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD REFUSED TO BUDGE FURTHER ON THE COMINFORMISTS
3 DURING MINIC'S VISIT TO MOSCOW ALMOST CERTAINLY CLEARED
2 THE WAY FOR THE PRESS RELEASE ON DAPCEVIC. DAPC-
1 EVIC LIVED IN THE USSR IN THE EARLY AND MID-60S

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BEFORE MOVING--WITH SOVIET PERMISSION--TO WESTERN
 EUROPE. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

5. EAST GERMANY: THE RECENT ARTICLE IN DER SPIEGEL CHARGING THAT
 EAST BERLIN FORCES THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN OF CITIZENS ATTEMPTING TO
 FLEE TO THE WEST HAS REPORTEDLY STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF THE
 HARD-LINE FACTION IN THE EAST GERMAN LEADERSHIP.4

25X1C ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE ATTENTION DEVOTED TO DER SPIEGEL'S CHARGES
 BY THE WESTERN MEDIA AND WEST GERMAN POLITICAL FIG-
 URES "BURST LIKE A BOMBSHELL" IN THE SED PARTY
 LEADERSHIP. THE ISSUE WAS REPORTEDLY SEIZED UPON
 BY MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO, NOTABLY PAUL VERNER,
 WHO HAS LONG ARGUED THAT AFTER HELSINKI THE WEST
 WOULD GRADUALLY REVERT TO A COLD WAR MENTALITY.

4 VERNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SECURITY AND DEFENSE

3 NATURALLY FOCUS HIS CONCERN ON THE THREAT POSED BY

2 DETENTE [REDACTED] THAT THOSE EAST GERMAN

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1 OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO PLAY A ROLE IN

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HUMANITARIAN CASES ARE NOW MORE VULNERABLE TO SE-
VERE CRITICISM FROM THE VERNER FACTION.4

MEANWHILE, THE PROPAGANDA RESPONSE OF THE EAST
GERMANS TO THE DER SPIEGEL ARTICLE HAS BECOME EX-
TREMELY VITRIOLIC. FOR INSTANCE, AN EDITORIAL IN
THE PARTY DAILY, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, ON DECEMBER 23,
ACCUSED THE CDU/CSU AND STRAUSS OF ATTEMPTING TO
TORPEDO DETENTE. THE EDITORIAL SAID THE PRESENT
CDU "PLAN" AGAINST PANKOW WAS BEING CONDUCTED IN
A NAZI STYLE REMINISCENT OF GOEBBELS. IN A VEILED
THREAT, THE EDITORIAL NOTED THAT THREE MILLION
WEST GERMAN CITIZENS VISITED THE GDR IN 1975, BUT
THAT A "POISONING OF THE ATMOSPHERE" COULD BLOCK
4 THE WAY TO FURTHER NORMALIZATION. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2, IMPDET.4

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 199-75.4

1. CHILE: PRESIDENT PINOCHET'S DECISION TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF PRIESTS WHO WERE BEING DETAINED FOR AIDING FUGITIVE TERRORISTS HAS HALTED—AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT—THE STEADY DECLINE IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. FUNDAMENTAL TENSIONS REMAIN, HOWEVER, AND THE CHURCH IS LIKELY TO REMAIN AN IRRITANT TO THE REGIME.

IN MAKING THE AMNESTY GESTURE, PINOCHET TACITLY ADMITTED THAT MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY CHARGED WITH HARBORING "CRIMINALS" MIGHT HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY ALTRUISTIC MOTIVES AND SENTIMENTS OF MERCY. THE PRESIDENT WARNED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TREAT FUTURE OFFENDERS QUITE SO GENEROUSLY. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH HAD EARLIER AGREED TO DISMANTLE THE INTERDENOMINATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR PEACE, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAD STRONGLY CRITICIZED FOR BEING PRO-MARXIST.

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1. MESSAGE MARGINS FOR ROUTING AND HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
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CHURCH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT PINOCHET'S ■■ INTERIOR
 MINISTER, GENERAL CESAR BENAVIDES, IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO
 IMPROVING RELATIONS. THE MINISTER IS SAID TO BE A DOCTRINAIRE,
 STUBBORN INDIVIDUAL WHO REFUSES TO COMPROMISE; HIS OBSTINACY,
 WHICH IS NOT OUT OF STEP WITH THE PURITANICAL PINOCHET, PROBABLY
 ACCOUNTS FOR A LARGE MEASURE OF THE REGIME'S RIGIDITY ON THE HUMAN
 RIGHTS ISSUE. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY'S RULINGS ON DETENTIONS
 HAVE FREQUENTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE BAD PRESS THAT CHILE HAS
 RECEIVED ABROAD. {CONFIDENTIAL}// E-2IMPDET.H

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